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Abstract—Over the past half-century, technology has evolved
beyond our wildest dreams. However, while the benefits of
technological growth are undeniable, the nascent Internet did
not anticipate the online threats we routinely encounter and
the harms which can result. As our world becomes increas-
ingly connected, it is critical we consider what implications
current and future technologies have for security and privacy.
We approach this challenge by surveying 30 predictions across
industry, academia and international organisations to extract a
number of common themes. Through this, we distill 10 emerging
scenarios and reflect on the impact these might have on a range of
stakeholders. Considering gaps in best practice and requirements
for further research, we explore how security and privacy might
evolve over the next decade. We find that existing guidelines
both fail to consider the relationships between stakeholders and
do not address the novel risks from wearable devices and insider
threats. Our approach rigorously analyses emerging scenarios
and suggests future improvements, of crucial importance as we
look to pre-empt new technological threats.
Index Terms—Emerging scenarios, cybersecurity, privacy, fu-
ture technologies
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past half-century, technology has evolved beyond
our wildest dreams. While we once completed our time-
shared tasks on chunky mainframes, we now collaborate on
documents using our mobile phones. Though these advances
have created innumerable benefits for society, they have also
brought many risks to security and privacy. Since the Internet
was not predicted to face malicious intent, this architecture is
now victim to a host of phishing, spam and malware attacks.
We currently stand at the dawn of a further technological
revolution, with the growth of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) and
sophisticated machine learning techniques. As we begin to live
our lives ‘online’, it is crucial we consider what future changes
might mean for security and privacy.
Due to this criticality, several predictions have been made
in industry, academia and international organisations. For
instance, The Microsoft Cyberspace2025 [1] report considers
three technological possibilities: a stable but stalled ‘plat-
eau’, a cooperative and innovative ‘peak’, and a ‘canyon’ of
fragmented solutions. Choo [2] approached the topic from a
criminological angle, with his scenarios ranging from mobile
device malware to highly-sophisticated phishing attacks. The
World Economic Forum [3] collated interviews from global
executives and discussed hackers stunting economic growth,
threats damaging online services, and resilience triggering
further innovation. Through surveying many such scenarios,
we found that while reports often differ in scope and audience,
there are several common themes.
In this paper we consolidate 30 scenarios from a number of
studies to explore those technological futures most frequently
considered. Rather than fielding remote predictions, we use a
rigorous methodology to identify common existing themes and
distil 10 emerging scenarios. We reflect on these possibilities,
which include the proliferation of attack tools, before consid-
ering their potential impact on a range of stakeholders. We
then analyse existing security frameworks and best practices,
exploring their suitability in these new environments. Finally,
we characterise what research is required to address outstand-
ing security and privacy risks, and consider implications for
policy makers and academia.
II. METHODOLOGY
Our methodology consists of four stages, using an iter-
ative approach to identify those scenarios most-frequently
considered. Rather than merely fielding our own predictions,
we distil emerging scenarios from a wide range of surveyed
literature. These stages are as follows:
1) We surveyed a large number of existing security and
privacy predictions, many of which are described in
Section III. These works originated from a range of
fields, including academia, industry and international
organisations. This was critical to ensure we considered
both predictions grounded in technical expertise and
those written at a policy level. Regardless of background,
these articles were selected based on three key criteria:
relevance, citation count and rigour of methodology.
2) The works were then indexed and their predictions
individually extracted. Whereas several articles clearly
delineated between different situations, others required
careful inspection to isolate scenarios. We coded these
predictions based on their general themes, such as ‘big
data’, enabling exploration of which points academia,
industry and organisations were in agreement.
3) Next, we grouped similar predictions, repeating this
process in an iterative fashion until we achieved conver-
gence. Where assigned codes concerned related trends,
such as ‘big data’ and ‘machine learning’, these were
merged to construct rich categories. From our initial 30
scenarios, we distilled 10 predictions which we found
most representative.
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4) Finally, we expanded these scenarios into brief narratives
for further analysis. Through considering the themes
identified in each instance, we went on to explore
how these changes could affect societies commercially,
technologically and politically.
III. EMERGING SCENARIOS
We now present our surveyed predictions before consol-
idating common themes into core emerging scenarios. These
works originate from industry, international organisations and
academia, providing a comprehensive base for our analyses.
A. Surveyed predictions
Among industrial predictions, Burt et al. [1] developed
the Microsoft Cyberspace2025 report, considering scenarios
grounded in an econometric model. In addition to the quant-
itative analysis of 100 socio-economic indicators, qualitative
insights were sourced from researchers and experts. They
constructed three future scenarios: ‘peak’ comprising the em-
bracement of technology, ‘plateau’ representing piecemeal cy-
ber adoption, and ‘canyon’ theorising protectionist strategies.
Hunter [4], performing industrial research through Gartner,
plotted an x-axis of targets against a y-axis of authorit-
ies. His scenario quadrants ranged from regulated risk (the
establishment of software liabilities) to coalition rule (the
growth of underground hackers). In a less formalised approach,
ICSPA [5] validated their concepts through an expert panel.
Through collaboration with the TrendMicro security firm, they
discussed a second-generation digital native, a business in a
highly-technological market, and a future nation state.
Organisational predictions included that from the World
Economic Forum [3], who collated interviews and workshops
with global executives. Through this, they considered expert
feedback before constructing a 14-point roadmap for external
collaboration. These findings were drawn into several scen-
arios, including governments erecting technological barriers
and the adoption of new trade innovations. Schwartz [6], writ-
ing for the Center for a New American Security, considered
optimistic and pessimistic predictions. Through his analyses
of policy and technology he identified both scenarios and in-
dicators of cybersecurity progress. His considerations included
the construction of national networks and the proliferation of
simple attack tools.
We finally surveyed academic predictions, including scen-
arios from the Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity
[7]. They convened an interdisciplinary conference with ex-
perts from computer science and politics. From nascent ideas
formed during the sessions, Berkeley graduate researchers
developed the concepts into five detailed narratives. These
included the Internet becoming an anarchy and the monitoring
of human emotions. Benzel [8] took an alternative approach,
describing discussions from a US Department of Homeland
Security session concerning cybersecurity. The event saw a
number of working groups deliberating those objectives which
should be prioritised over the next five years. Recommenda-
tions included increasing the role of the private sector and
developing metrics to evaluate cyber investments. In contrast,
Choo [2] conducted an exploration of cybercrime and how this
might evolve in the future. Through considering affairs in the
US, UK and Australia, he constructed several predictions and
suggested criminological prevention strategies. His scenarios
ranged from social media propaganda to the escalation of
international tensions.
B. Constructed scenarios
Our 10 emerging scenarios are now discussed in detail, con-
sidering the technological, commercial and political possibil-
ities of the next decade. These scenarios are not necessarily
complementary, but describe a range of potential eventualities.
They are as follows:
1) Growth of the Internet-of-Things. The Internet-of-
Things (IoT) pervades daily life, blurring the physical
and virtual worlds. This entanglement leads to online
risks becoming increasingly intangible, contributing to
further cyber-threats [9]. Social norms evolve suffi-
ciently that the IoT is considered ‘normal’ and those who
shun these novel technologies are viewed as antiquated.
([1–3, 5, 7])
2) Proliferation of offensive tools. Offensive government
cyber capabilities and the proliferation of simple attack
tools both contribute to frequent incidents. Nation-state
weaponry leaks onto the black market and is reused by
cybercriminals to steal from organisations. Intelligence
agencies stockpile zero-day vulnerabilities rather than
informing affected vendors, resulting in a deluge of data
breaches ([1–4, 7]).
3) Privacy becomes reinterpreted. The concept of privacy
is reinterpreted by ‘digital natives’ who have been raised
in an age of social networking and ubiquitous Internet
access. Individuals become accustomed to the develop-
ment of invasive technologies which offer great benefits
to convenience and productivity. Lives are lived ‘online’
and reputational damage is frequent as citizens display
intimate histories through digital portals ([5, 7]).
4) Repressive enforcement of online order. While many
states take liberal risk-based approaches, several favour
repressive means to enforce order online. This leads to
blanket censorship and surveillance, an order stronger
than in current regimes, damaging cross-border trade
and placing global commerce under pressure. Although
these measures successfully reduce the scale of domestic
cyber-attacks, the injury to free enterprise results in
economic degradation ([1, 2, 4, 5]).
5) Heterogeneity of state postures. The heterogeneity of
state technology postures stifles international agreement
and cooperation over cyber norms. This raises global
tensions as attacks increasingly originate from ‘safe
havens’ who refuse to prosecute their cyber criminals.
The challenge of digital attribution leads to a fragmenta-
tion of shared understandings, with nations treating their
allies with cool suspicion ([1–5]).
6) Traditional business models under pressure. The
concept of intellectual property evolves as traditional
business models are placed under increasing pressure
from both pirates and new competitors. Established
market leaders fall and sell their data assets to innovative
firms better-equipped to operate in these novel environ-
ments. Cloud platforms become the norm, with individu-
als granting increased agency to those companies which
store their data ([1, 4, 5, 7]).
7) Big data enables greater control. Big data and machine
learning supports the manipulation of individuals’ be-
haviour by corporations and governments. Sophisticated
statistical analysis enables companies to intricately tailor
their advertisements, while political parties customise
their media campaigns to target individual citizens.
While these developments benefit commerce and law
enforcement, deviations from the norm are increasingly
viewed with suspicion ([5, 7, 8]).
8) Growth of public-private partnerships. Organisations
continue to know more about their customers than
national governments, contributing to the growth of
public-private data-sharing partnerships. These arrange-
ments are indeed beneficial to national security, but
large parts of critical infrastructure remain owned by
foreign corporations. This reliance on private industry
shifts considerable power from elected state officials to
unaccountable executives, resulting in damage to the
democratic process. With power production frequently
under the influence of foreign investors, national security
becomes critically undermined ([1–3, 5, 8]).
9) Citizens demand greater control. Some citizens de-
mand greater transparency and agency over their online
data. Technologically-literate individuals store inform-
ation remotely, occasionally selling details for a range
of benefits. Corporations offer paid alternatives to data-
hungry social networks, creating new markets for on-
line communities and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
(PETs) ([2, 4, 5, 7]).
10) Organisations value cyber-resilience. Cyber-resilience
is increasingly important for informing business de-
cisions, with issues such as insider threats high on the
agenda. The infeasibility of absolute security drives a
market for cyber-insurance, as corporations adopt pre-
scribed measures to reduce their premiums. Board rooms
quickly learn the reputational costs of cyber-attacks,
resulting in greater private investment in the actuarial
and mathematical sciences ([2–5, 8]).
C. Stakeholder impact
We continue by considering our emerging scenarios and the
impact they could have at three stakeholder levels: individual,
organisational and national. Investigation of stakeholder im-
pact is crucial to explore how ordinary citizens, corporations
and governments may operate in the future. Considerations
are summarised below in Fig. 1, with yellow, orange and red
representing low, medium and high impact, respectively. These
ratings were determined through identifying which scenarios
could critically affect a stakeholder, which would require
changes in practice, and which would have a limited impact.
In detail, the stakeholder impacts are as follows:
Figure 1: Emerging scenarios and stakeholder impact
1) The pervasion of the Internet-of-Things would present
dangerous opportunities for the surveillance of individu-
als, particularly if biological data is accessible through
implanted devices. While organisations would benefit
from enhanced home-working efficiencies, they must
defend against Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) risks.
Although national governments would benefit econom-
ically from the IoT, the dependence of critical infra-
structure on modern technologies would greatly increase
attack surfaces.
2) The proliferation of attack tools would place individu-
als under the ubiquitous risk of identity theft. Organisa-
tions similarly must defend against data exfiltration (of
high impact) and therefore might be less willing to store
customer data. International tensions would be fraught
as high-profile attacks become commonplace, especially
with attribution appearing largely intractable.
3) Reinterpretations of privacy would see PII (Personally
Identifiable Information) lose its importance as more-
sensitive details, such as sexual orientation, are available
through social media. Although organisations encourage
the exchange of data for convenience, they are at risk
of their own employees sharing confidential information.
Nations benefit from large collections of open source in-
telligence, but find their citizenry increasingly dependent
on services hosted in foreign countries.
4) The repressive enforcement of online order would in-
volve widespread filtering, censorship and surveillance,
highlighted as high impact in Fig. 1. Organisational
opportunities would be stifled by both technological
restrictions and costly regulatory compliance. Foreign
opposition to repressive policies would damage interna-
tional trade, while prosecuting dissidents would be both
challenging and expensive.
5) The heterogeneity of state postures would result in
minimal cross-border personal data protection, espe-
cially when nations differ in their definitions of PII.
Unpredictable international relations would contribute
to market instability, while high-impact cyber attacks
continue from ‘safe havens’. Reductions in information
sharing would damage law enforcement, with global
tensions increasing through frequent disagreements.
6) The evolution of new business models would see indi-
viduals’ personal data become the most valuable com-
modity, frequently traded on global exchanges. Increased
market competitivity would depress profit margins while
organisations reel from ubiquitous copyright infringe-
ment. National economies are similarly weakened by
intellectual property violations and lose stability as es-
tablished firms are replaced by start-ups. With citizen
data increasingly residing in foreign data centres, both
individuals and governments would be vulnerable to the
decisions of other states.
7) Advances in big data and machine learning would
result in consumer manipulation and reductions to their
individual agency. Organisations would benefit from
sophisticated financial forecasting and seamless targeted
advertising. Nations better control their citizenry through
advanced media management, yet increasingly rely on a
technology bubble for their economic growth.
8) Public-private data-sharing partnerships would in-
fringe individuals’ rights as their personal data is shared
with foreign governments. The wider distribution of this
information would also increase the risk of confidential-
ity being breached. Although organisations might learn
valuable threat intelligence, they could have their repu-
tations damaged by governmental arrangements. While
national agencies would acquire valuable data, foreign
states might exert an troubling corporate influence over
critical infrastructure.
9) Although citizen demands might give certain indi-
viduals greater freedom, technical literacy is required
and commercial costs would be inherited through price
increases. Organisations struggle under the pressure to
reveal corporate information while national governments
find themselves increasingly accountable to their cit-
izens. Despite both initiatives being beneficial to demo-
cracy, they weaken domestic economies against unac-
countable rival states.
10) The importance of cyber-resilience emphasises the
ubiquitous personal risk from data breaches. Organisa-
tions would invest in costly technological protection,
but still fall victim to high-impact Advanced Persistent
Threats (APTs). Insider threats would challenge the
sensitive world of government, particularly since the
capabilities of malicious employees will increase with
ubiquitous technology. As a result, frequent breaches in
both the public and private sectors could undermine trust
in state institutions.
IV. CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY
As a next stage, we reflect on the future applicability
of current ‘best practice’ guidelines for individuals, organ-
isations and nations. This is of great importance, as these
documents inform stakeholder groups and are expected to
guard against technological threats. We summarise the gaps
in current frameworks, selecting several key examples due
to space restrictions, and point to required research and
development. At the individual level, we consider the main
UK and US government initiatives for improving cybersecurity
practices: for the UK, the Cyber Streetwise campaign [10], and
for the US, Stop.Think.Connect [11]. The UK Get Safe Online
initiative was also considered, but this effort is private sector
and less authoritative than Cyber Streetwise. For organisations,
we examine the US National Institute for Standards and
Technology’s (NIST) cybersecurity framework [12], and the
Center for Internet Security’s Critical Security Controls (CIS
CSC) [13]. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide [14] and NATO Na-
tional Cybersecurity Framework Manual [15] are considered
as internationally-recognised guidelines for nations. Based on
our findings, we conclude this section with a call to action for
researchers, stakeholders and policy makers.
A. Gaps in existing guidelines
While advantageous for the present day, awareness cam-
paigns for individuals do not translate to a future in which
the IoT pervades daily life. In this future, individuals’ under-
standing of, and agency over, their online presence is key to the
protection of their privacy. Current campaigns go some way
to promoting good practice in this area (e.g. recommendations
for protecting privacy when using social media [10]; privacy-
protecting recommendations given for the use of web services,
devices, purchase history, and location [11]). However, these
initiatives do not extend to educating citizens on the privacy
implications of increasingly-used wearable, biometric and
sensor-based technologies. Nor is clear usable advice given
on the specific types of data collected by different applications
and devices. For guidelines to be suitable for future scenarios,
campaigns must focus on emerging technologies and give
specific, practical advice. Furthermore, these public initiatives
should be periodically evaluated to ascertain their effective-
ness in improving individuals’ behaviour. Whether undertaken
through large-scale surveys or targeted focus groups, feedback
mechanisms would enable campaigns to be iteratively refined.
Existing frameworks for organisations do not adequately
address those human aspects which will be key to future cor-
porate cybersecurity. The NIST and CSC documents [12, 13]
are highly comprehensive, with useful references to external
guidelines. They do not, however, provide frameworks within
which the human aspects of organisational cybersecurity can
be addressed; namely, problems arising from insider threats
and BYOD. For instance, NIST aims to mitigate insider threats
by recommending the comparison of personnel actions against
expected behaviours and data-flow baselines. CSC addresses
the problem by advocating the controlled use of administrator
privileges, access controls on a “need to know” basis, and the
monitoring of employee and contractor accounts. While these
activities are essential, employee tracking alone will not de-
fend against insiders who are aware of the monitoring systems
in place [16]. Unfortunately, both frameworks fail to give any
consideration to the growing need to study personnel motives
or to monitor behaviour from a psychological perspective.
Both the NIST and CSC recommendations protect organisa-
tions against BYOD risks insofar as they specify that physical
devices should be inventoried and monitored. We foresee a
huge expansion in the ownership of IoT products, resulting in
an increase in the number of personally-owned devices present
in the workplace; in particular, wearables and implants. In this
future, registering all connected products will not be feasible.
Sophisticated means of mitigating IoT and BYOD risk are
required [17], such as protection against potentially-invisible
devices (e.g. implanted medical chips) which are challenging
to catalogue. This is crucial to recognising the increasing
corporate blur between internal and external spaces.
Cybersecurity frameworks for nations [14, 15] recom-
mend international cooperation to unite national strategies.
Set against our future scenarios, this is extremely optimistic,
especially between non-allied states. Indeed, it is predicted that
heterogeneous state postures and differing cybersecurity laws
will stifle international cooperation. This combined with the
proliferation of cyber weaponry and problems of attribution
suggests that the alignment of national strategies is unrealistic.
Of greater importance is the construction of policies and legis-
lation which allows states to suit their own, and international,
interests in a non-unified cyber landscape.
Based on our scenarios, we foresee that both state cyber
weaponry will grow and international tensions will escalate
as a result of high-profile incidents. A recent example of
expected events is the unattributed Ukrainian power outage
of December 2015, apparently caused by a cyber-attack [18].
Currently, agreement of those terms key to building legislation
is lacking. For example, there are no widely-agreed definitions
for either “cyber warfare” or “cyber attack” [15]. Legislation in
this area is crucial to maintaining order in the coming decades.
B. Requirements for research and development
Based on the gaps identified, much work is required to
extend cybersecurity frameworks for the future. We discuss
areas that must be addressed through academic research, the
development of policy, and action by stakeholders.
For the protection of individuals’ privacy, policies and
laws on collection, storage and processing must be recon-
sidered in light of the increased sensitivity and abundance
of data. Education will be central to afford citizens the
understanding to retain agency over their information, with
progress monitored through national surveys. The development
of disclosure metrics for individuals and organisations will
help technology users perceive the risks of their decisions,
and assist regulators in detecting abuse. Similarly, methods to
predict the lifetime and impact of sensitive data would enable
individuals to understand their risk exposure. Usable privacy
solutions should also be developed, such as applications which
highlight the data collected by wearable devices.
For organisations, research into the human aspects of
insider threat, such as behavioural psychology and crimino-
logy, is important. Both the corporate adoption of education
schemes and the consideration of employees’ actions are
critical to proactively mitigating these risks. Whilst existing
studies have began to explore the psychological, behavioural,
cultural and technical characteristics of insider threats [19],
further research is required to develop comprehensive solutions
that are ultimately useful for organisations. The evolution
of current practice is crucial if companies wish to maintain
resistance against increasingly-sophisticated insider threats.
BYOD currently poses a number of organisational chal-
lenges [17, 20] and our emerging scenarios suggest this situ-
ation will only become worse. To protect companies against
the increased number and variety of personal devices brought
to the office, two developments are required. Firstly, ap-
plications should be built which secure company networks
against personal technologies. Secondly, effective organisa-
tional policies should be implemented to manage risk in a
future pervaded by wearable and implanted devices.
At the national level, more specificity is required in calls
for international cooperation. Whilst some states will negotiate
mutual pledges, as the US and China did in their 2015 Cyber
Agreement [21], the global unification of security postures
is highly unlikely. As such, both international cybersecurity
bodies and frameworks for addressing key matters, such as
piracy and cross-border law enforcement, must function in a
heterogeneous environment. We predict the ownership of large
parts of critical national infrastructure by foreign corporations,
granting power to foreign investors and underlying states. In
a cyber landscape in which nations are not concordant, legal
agreements and technological solutions are required to address
external control over critical infrastructure.
As offensive cyber weapons proliferate and global ten-
sions increase, legislation on ‘acts of war’ and digitally-
proportionate responses must be defined. It is inevitable that
nation-state cyber weaponry will reach the black market, and
therefore it is crucial the consequences of its use are under-
stood [22]. Furthermore, strong controls should be enforced
to avoid the escalation of these most harmful risks.
Interactions between individuals, organisations and na-
tions must also be considered. While we have explored the
future scenario impact on our three stakeholders individually,
in reality, there are several relationships and dependencies
between these parties. For example, the effect that advances
in machine learning will have on individuals’ privacy will
depend largely on both the regulations governing data col-
lection and the behaviour of organisations. There is, how-
ever, no single document that details cybersecurity guidelines
across these three differing levels. This lack of cohesion
introduces complex subtleties and key dependencies can be
missed. Broad frameworks would enable a clear vision of
both current cybersecurity practices and their future weak-
nesses. However, it might be challenging to locate a party
capable of constructing such a comprehensive document. This
is especially true considering the international scope of the
field, with recommendations required to be equally applicable
to a Chinese power station and a US bank. Specificity is
naturally in tension with generality, and new guidelines would
also require frequent update to ensure they are suitable. These
factors, and the difficulty of selecting an authorship trusted
by all international parties, ensure that the construction of
a comprehensive document would be challenging. However,
such efforts are essential if we wish to protect security and
privacy in an uncertain global future.
Perhaps a more achievable proposal would be to increase
collaboration between guideline authors at the individual,
organisational and national levels. Such unification of ap-
proaches and ideas would enable the production of frameworks
which are more strongly contextualised against cybersecurity
at all levels. We illustrate this point by drawing on our above
example, which is based on advances in machine learning
and consumer prediction capabilities. This scenario highlights
a discrepancy between the recommendations made at the
organisational and individual level. Given that guidelines in the
former [12,13] provide only limited advice on the use of sens-
itive consumer information, the latter’s [10, 11] recommenda-
tions on data protection is inadequate to maintain privacy in
a world of sensor-based devices. In the space between these
two frameworks, there are real risks of organisational data use
against individuals’ wishes. These gaps could be bridged by
collaboration between the authors of such guidelines.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Emerging scenarios provide useful insights into the fu-
ture of security and privacy. While previous predictions are
diverse in their scopes and audiences, through constructing
representative futures, we explored those developments most
frequently-anticipated. Our study of the impact on individu-
als, organisations and nations highlights key considerations
for these important stakeholders. We also analysed existing
frameworks and best practices, identifying guidelines which
do not adequately translate to future predictions. Our findings
suggest avenues for research and development, including pri-
vacy education for the general public, approaches to mitigate
organisational insider threat, greater investigation of BYOD
risk, and international legislation for cyber warfare. It is crucial
that emerging scenarios are explored in anticipation of the
security and privacy threats of the coming decade.
We have considered a number of possibilities for future
work. Firstly, we could conduct a technical analysis of why
reputable guidelines fail to address the threats from emerging
scenarios. In this work, we could rigorously examine indi-
vidual sections in ‘best practice’ documents and identify which
areas urgently require updating. Secondly, these emerging
scenarios could be explored within the context of specific
domains, such as healthcare. The pervasion of the Internet-of-
Things might be beneficial with the development of wireless
sensors, but also threaten welfare when critical devices are
compromised. Similarly, although advances in big data might
revolutionise the detection of health conditions, these measures
could unfairly increase insurance premiums for victims of
profiling. Finally, we could expand our scope and explore
future possibilities for technology as a whole. The coming
decades promise to radically change how we perceive digital
devices, and it is crucial we are prepared for these novel
developments.
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